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Introduction 
The victim of crime1 is not an active participant per se in the criminal justice system. The victim 
is effectively a third party whose input to the criminal justice process is confined to that of being 
an informant2 and witness for the prosecution. The right of victims to actively participate in the 
criminal justice process has conventionally been denied owing to the “public prosecution” model 
of criminal justice and the need to safeguard the impartiality of the criminal trial.   
 
In recent decades, however, victims of crime have been afforded greater recognition by the 
criminal justice system.3 In Ireland, the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (“the 1993 Act”), which was, 
in some measure, enacted in response to several controversial sexual offence cases,4 made 
various changes to the law in relation to the victims of crime, such as the review of unduly 
lenient sentences, compensation orders for victims of crime and provision for Victim Impact 
Statements (VIS) to be taken into consideration by the trial court before imposing sentence.5 
These advancements to the standing of victims were augmented by the Department of Justice 
Equality and Law Reform’s revised Victims Charter and Guide to the Criminal Justice System 
2001. Further recognition of victims’ rights at European level was provided by the Council 
Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings 2001,6 applicable to 
victims of crime within EU Member States. After examining some issues around victims’ rights, 
this article will review these statutory developments.  
 
 
Contemporary role of victims  
The law has conventionally made a distinction between criminal and civil wrongs. In the civil 
justice system, it is the victim who decides whether or not to take a civil action against a wrong-
doer. This course of action is not applicable in the criminal justice system, where the victim of 
crime does not have a decisive role as to whether or not a criminal prosecution is instigated 
against the accused. As the State deemed criminal wrongs to be more important, it assumed the 
role of prosecutor, with the result that the standing of the victim in the criminal justice system 
was reduced to that of being, as noted above, an informant and witness for the prosecution.  
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Until the nineteenth century it was the victim who decided whether the offender would be 
prosecuted. Criminal prosecutions were generally regarded as private proceedings whereby the 
victim of crime could obtain retribution and restitution against the offender.7 However, from the 
late nineteenth century onwards, the criminal justice system became more organised, with the 
establishment of a “public prosecution” model of criminal justice, a professional police force and 
a prison system. The result was that the State assumed responsibility for the prosecution and 
punishment of offenders.8 The transition from private prosecutions to public prosecutions by the 
State was a gradual one, and it occurred not only as a result of the professionalisation of the 
criminal justice system but as a consequence of a clear departure from the blood feud,9 a mode of 
justice that had prevailed at common law.10 The rationale behind such changes was that private 
individuals should leave the administration of the criminal justice system to specially trained 
professionals. Christie11 has contended that with the establishment of a formalised criminal 
justice system, the conflict that previously existed between the victim and offender has been 
“appropriated” by that system, relegating the role of the victim in the system.12 
 
Criminal justice studies have typically focused more on the offender and the cause of crime than 
on the standing of the victim as a participant in the criminal justice process.13 This practice may 
be disadvantageous to the criminal justice system, as there is a real possibility that victims of 
crime—if they feel alienated from the process—may become uncooperative in the prosecution of 
offenders.14   
 
The victim does retain a very important role in the criminal justice process, however, given that 
the police15 are in some measure dependent upon the victim to bring the commission of a crime 
to the attention of the authorities. Furthermore, while the victim retains the limited right of 
private prosecutor, indictable offences must be prosecuted in the name of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (formerly the Attorney General).16 
 
 
Victims’ rights and services 
A distinction has conventionally been made between the procedural rights17 of victims during the 
criminal justice process and the substantive rights of victims to services18 either provided by or 
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supported by the State, with more emphasis typically being placed on the provision of services 
for victims. Ashworth19 explains that: 
 
“Among the rights to services may be a right to call upon emotional and practical support 
in the period following the offence; a right to be kept informed and to be treated with 
respect and sympathy by law enforcement agents during the investigation process; a right 
to be treated with respect and understanding before and during court proceedings; and a 
right to compensation for victims of criminal violence ... Of a different nature are 
procedural rights for victims in the criminal process: such as rights to be consulted on the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, on the bail-custody decision, on the acceptance of a 
plea, on sentence, and on parole release.” 
 
In the main, little attention has been paid to the provision of procedural rights for victims of 
crime. In recent decades, however, due to persistent campaigns by victims’ rights groups, there 
has been some recognition by the State for the provision of such rights. The result is that victims 
now have some input into the criminal justice decision-making process.20 
 
There are reasonable arguments, however, for excluding victim participation in the criminal 
justice process. First, the criminal justice system is founded on the notion of impartiality, i.e. the 
judiciary and the jury must be unbiased in the adjudication process so as to ensure a fair and 
impartial trial of the accused. Secondly, the application of the constitutional principle of 
equality21 mandates that all victims of crime should have the offences alleged to have been 
committed against them equally considered by the court. Thus, if the resources of the victim or 
the victim’s family have a significant impact on the criminal justice process, invidious 
discrimination could be claimed and consequently render the sentence imposed by the trial court 
subject to appellate review. Thirdly, the impact of crime on victims will invariably differ 
according to their various levels of robustness or lack thereof. Consequently, there is a real 
possibility that some victims may be more inclined to seek vengeance against the offender than 
others.22 This could result in sentencing disparity where the trial court is unduly swayed by the 
feelings or robustness of a particular victim, rather than determining the appropriate punishment 
to be imposed based on the level of blameworthiness of the defendant. The criminal justice 
process ought to determine the appropriate punishment to be imposed in individual cases 
according to the general principle of proportionality23 in the sentencing process, rather than 
according to a particular victim’s input to criminal justice decision-making, which in itself 
conflicts with the principle of impartiality mandated by a criminal trial and may introduce a 
degree of arbitrariness—even vindictiveness—to the criminal justice process.24 
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Many European states,25 including Ireland, provide various services to victims of crime, 
including counselling, financial support and compensation. Such services are supported by the 
European Forum for Victim Services.26 Although there are multifarious substantive and 
procedural rights to ensure a fair and impartial trial of the accused, the victim of crime has not 
been afforded comparative rights in recognition of the fact that the criminal offence was 
committed against him.27 Should victims have a role in deciding, for example, whether to 
prosecute the accused, the charges that should be brought, whether the accused should get bail 
pending trial, the sentence that should be imposed and whether parole should be granted.28 
 
On what basis can victims be afforded procedural rights? Do they depend on the “acknowledged 
reliance of the criminal process upon their participation”,29 or is there some other legal basis? 
Edwards30 implicitly considers the participatory rights of victims in the criminal justice process 
as emanating from the concept of citizenship:  
 
“To participate may involve being in control, having a say, being listened to, or being 
treated with dignity and respect—all aspirations of those within the victims movement; but 
it may also mean providing information whether one wants to or not.”  
 
It has also been argued that as victims are essentially “consumers of the criminal justice 
process,” they should expect and demand more from the criminal justice system, including 
procedural rights.31 Zedner32 explains that: 
 
“The reliance of the criminal justice system on the victim has proved a powerful 
bargaining tool in the recognition of victims’ interest ... Cast in the role of consumer, 
victims are encouraged to demand better information about the progress of ‘their’ case and 
insist that their views are obtained and considered when key decisions are made in respect 
of bail, remand, diversion, and the like.” 
 
The legal basis for the provision of procedural rights for victims remains uncertain and might 
require an appropriate legislative response. In 2002, Fine Gael introduced a Victims Rights Bill. 
Although never enacted, this Bill could potentially have formed the legal basis “for the treatment 
of and rights of victims of criminal offences and of their immediate families in the Irish criminal 
justice system”.33  
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The victim of crime, particularly in the case of violent crimes and sexual offences, has a vested 
interest in the prosecution authorities proceeding with the case against the accused without undue 
delay. In cases that involve continuous adjournments, the prolonged agony suffered by the victim 
as a result of the offender’s crimes would undoubtedly be exacerbated. The accused  may have a 
vested interest in suspending the prosecution of the charges against him, as the memories of 
witnesses might fade with time or those witnesses might die or relocate. Furthermore, the victim 
does not have a right to a speedy trial of the criminal charges against the accused.34 In 
consideration of the fact that the victim of crime brings to the attention of the authorities the fact 
that a crime has been committed, should the victim not have locus standi to seek a judicial 
review of the prosecution’s decision not to proceed with the criminal trial where a succession of 
adjournments had been granted? The difficulty with granting such procedural rights to victims is 
the potential for the eventual development of a tripartite prosecution model: victim, offender and 
prosecution—a procedure that could be constitutionally questionable. 
 
Should victims have separate legal representation during the course of the criminal trial or would 
such a provision constitute undue interference with the effective administration of justice? If it 
was generally the case that victims had separate legal representation,35 then the criminal trial 
process might be unduly prolonged due to continuous interjections from the victim’s counsel. 
Furthermore, the victim should not per se have an input into the criminal justice process until the 
trial has concluded, as this may prejudice the accused’s right to a fair and impartial criminal trial 
in due course of law. Once the trial has concluded, the victim may submit a VIS to the court for 
consideration before the appropriate sentence is imposed. Perhaps, however, the victim could be 
provided with legal advice—though not legal representation36—especially in the case of sexual 
offences and violent crimes. The legal adviser, although not actively representing the victim of 
crime during the trial, could offer counsel and explain to the victim the various roles of those in 
the courtroom and the victim’s role in the entire process.37 
 
Shapland, Wilmore and Duff38 conducted a survey of victims in the mid-1980’s, tracing selected 
cases from arrest to conviction. Victims were interviewed at all stages of the process. The results 
showed that what victims mostly want is compensation for personal injuries or damage to 
property and, of equal importance, information on the operation of the criminal justice process, 
e.g., why a particular sentence was passed. Victims of crime generally do not know how the 
criminal justice system operates and consequently feel alienated. While the requirements of all 
victims will not necessarily be the same, providing victims with information on the various 
components of the process—the trial, sentencing, bail, the procedures for appeals and releases, 
etc.—could help to address many other concerns.39 Arguably, the criminal justice system is still 
fundamentally about victims; it aims to deter people from victimising others and, when this does 
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occur, prosecutes and punishes offenders.40 However, victims of crime continue to have less 
input to the criminal justice decision-making process than they would generally like to have. 
 
 
Prosecution appeals against sentence 
The 1993 Act introduced a procedure whereby the prosecution could make an application for the 
Court of Criminal Appeal to review what is deemed to have been an unduly lenient sentence 
imposed by the trial court.41 Section 2(1) of the Act provides that: 
 
“If it appears to the Director of Public Prosecutions that a sentence imposed by a court 
(in this Act referred to as the ‘sentencing court’) on conviction of a person on indictment 
was unduly lenient, he may apply to the Court of Criminal Appeal to review the 
sentence.” (emphasis added). 
 
This provision is applicable only to trials on indictment and there is no comparable provision for 
appeals against unduly lenient sentences imposed by a court of summary jurisdiction. The Act 
goes on to state: “An application under this section shall be made, on notice given to the 
convicted person, within 28 days from the day on which the sentence was imposed”.42 Although 
this procedure allows for victims, or their families in the case of a homicide, to petition the 
prosecution authorities to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal to review an unduly lenient 
sentence, the sentencing process is exclusively the function of the courts. Nevertheless, this 
provision may serve to address the issue of sentencing disparity due to the absence of a proper 
structure for judicial sentencing guidance. Consequently, it might alleviate, to some degree, the 
grievances of victims where an unduly lenient sentence had been imposed. 
 
 
Victim Impact Statements 
The 1993 Act also introduced a provision for the trial court, before imposing sentence on the 
defendant, to consider the adverse impact of the defendant’s crimes on the victim in cases 
involving violence or sexual offences.43 The general policy for the introduction of VIS44 was to 
provide victims of crime45 with the right to make a statement to the trial court concerning the 
impact the crime had upon him/her, such as physical and emotional injuries, economic loss and 
adverse changes in the victim’s employment situation.46 This provision gives the victim a sense 
of involvement in the criminal justice process; the trial court is taking notice of how they have 
been affected by the crime. This process may offer atonement to the victim, i.e. how the crime 
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affected the victim is taken into consideration by the trial court in determining the appropriate 
sentence to be imposed.47 However, while the provision of VIS affords the victim of crime with 
the opportunity to participate in the criminal justice process to a limited extent, the overall needs 
of victims of crime, i.e. the proper provision of rights and service, must not be neglected.48  
 
VIS may be tendered to the trial court in the case of sexual or violent criminal offences49 
whereby the trial judge shall take into consideration the adverse impact of the offence on the 
victim, for which the defendant has been convicted, in deciding the appropriate punishment to be 
imposed.50 Section 5(1) of the 1993 Act provides that: 
 
“In determining the sentence to be imposed on a person for an offence to which this section 
applies, a court shall take into account, and may, where necessary, receive evidence or 
submissions concerning, any effect (whether long-term or otherwise) of the offence on the 
person in respect of whom the offence was committed.” (emphasis added).51 
 
The provision thus adopts a narrow definition of the “victim,” excluding, it would appear, such 
indirect victims as the bereaved relatives of homicide victims. This may necessitate a broader 
definition, or perhaps interpretation by the courts, of the term “victim” for the purposes of 
including secondary victims in homicide cases to exercise this provision of the 1993 Act.52 The 
families of the deceased in homicide cases, the most heinous of all criminal offences,53 should be 
afforded the opportunity to express to the court the adverse effects of the defendants crime on 
them.  
 
VIS are submitted to the trial court with the objective of influencing the courts determination of 
the appropriate sentence to be imposed in individual cases. Section 5(3) of the 1993 Act provides 
that: 
 
                                                 
47
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British Journal of Criminology, 967 at 976. 
48
 The Law Reform Commission, Report on Sentencing (1996), ch.8 “Victim Impact Statements” para.8.6 states: 
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50
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51
 s.5(1) however, does not designate an authority to prepare victim impact statements for submission to the court on 
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52
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dead’, without acknowledging all the victims of a homicide”. 
53
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“Where a court is determining the sentence to be imposed on a person for an offence to 
which this section applies, the court shall, upon application by the person in respect of 
whom such offence was committed, hear the evidence of the person in respect of whom the 
offence was committed as to the effect of the offence on such person upon being requested 
to do so.” (emphasis added). 
 
The submission of VIS are not mandatory given that s.5(3) uses the phrase “upon application by 
the person in respect of whom such offence was committed”. The difficulty with this procedure 
is that the potential for inconsistency in the submission of VIS may result, to a certain degree, in 
sentencing disparity where some defendants may receive heavier sentences than others in 
similar circumstances due to the influence of a victim impact statement on the courts 
determination of the appropriate sentence to be imposed in an individual case.  
 
The principal argument against the provision of VIS is that they may unduly affect the trial 
court’s determination of the sentence to be imposed in a particular case and that, as 
consequence, they will ultimately serve to exacerbate sentencing disparity. As a general rule, 
however, the inclusion of VIS does not per se diminish the role of the prosecution and other 
official agencies in the prosecution of criminal offences, given that it merely provides a 
mechanism for the victim to express to the court the adverse effects of the defendant’s crimes 
upon the victim. As this procedure may have an impact on the sentence imposed by the court, 
however, the victim does effectively have an input into the criminal justice decision-making 
process.54 Thus, the inclusion of VIS may be justified on the basis that they will improve 
sentencing outcomes, promote efficiency and quality in sentencing and provide therapeutic 
benefits to victims.55 
 
Could the inclusion of VIS legitimise a victim’s expressions of vengeance?56 The proper use of 
VIS, in accordance with the purpose for which they were designed to achieve, will to a large 
extent depend on whether the objective of the Statement is to inform the court of the victims’ 
suffering as a result of the defendant’s crimes, or whether it is used by the victim to obtain 
vengeance against the offender.57 One question worth asking is whether the defendant could 
have an opportunity to challenge the VIS, for example, to cross-examine the victim or produce 
independent reports that might contradict the victim’s statements about the extent to which 
he/she has recovered from the crime. Affording the defendant such an opportunity could, 
however, make the victim an independent participant in the criminal trial, a procedure which 
could be constitutionally questionable. 
 
 
                                                 
54
 In many U.S. States, sentencing is done by jurors mainly in death penalty cases, where the relatives of the 
deceased victim may address the court, the purpose being to influence the court to impose a heavier punishment. 
Perhaps a legal representative should be appointed to assist victims of crime by delivering the victim impact 
statement in place of the victim, especially in traumatic cases. 
55
 See Edwards, “Victim Participating in Sentencing: The Problems of Incoherence” (2001) 40(1) Howard Journal, 
39 at 41–44. 
56
 The Law Reform Commission, Report on Sentencing (1996), ch.8 “Victim Impact Statements” para.8.2, inter 
alia, reads: “… the victim impact statement might be more trouble than its worth and it also might run counter to the 
State’s view of the crime. It might reintroduce the view that the victim is entitled to a pound of flesh, a view which 
goes back to the idea of individual retribution”. See also: Long, “Community Input at Sentencing: Victim’s Rights 
or Victim’s Revenge?” (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review, 187; Sarat, “Vengeance, Victims and the Identities 
of Law” (1997) 6(2) Social and Legal Studies, 163; Hall, “Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for 
Restraint” (1991) 28 American Criminal Law Review, 233. 
57
 Trial judges might be well advised to review victim impact statements before they are tendered to the court, so as 
to ensure that the content of the statement complies with the purpose for which they were intended. 
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Compensation 
As mentioned above, surveys have shown that information and compensation are the two main 
concerns of victims of crime.58 Where should this compensation come from? State-funded 
compensation schemes are relatively modern. In 1974, the Scheme of Compensation for Personal 
Injuries Criminally Inflicted was established on a non-statutory basis; the Government is free to 
curtail the scheme.59 It was introduced following the Dublin and Monaghan bombings to provide 
for out-of-pocket expenses and general damages. The Scheme initially worked well, but due to a 
budget cutback in 1986 it only covers out-of-pocket expenses and bills; compensation for pain 
and suffering are excluded.60  
 
Section 6 of the 1993 Act introduced a scheme for the provision of compensation from the 
offender to the victim, although this has not proven to be a very effective provision. Section 6(1) 
provides that: 
 
“Subject to the provisions of this section, on conviction of any person of an offence, the 
court, instead of or in addition to dealing with him in any other way, may, unless it sees 
reason to the contrary, make (on application or otherwise) an order (in this Act referred to 
as a ‘compensation order’) requiring him to pay compensation in respect of any personal 
injury or loss resulting from that offence (or any other offence that is taken into 
consideration by the court in determining sentence) to any person (in this Act referred to as 
the ‘injured party’) who has suffered such injury or loss.” (emphasis added). 
 
A noteworthy aspect of this provision is that a compensation order is made “on application or 
otherwise,” which implies that the trial court has the authority to make an order for 
compensation regardless of such a petition being made by the injured party or victim. 
Furthermore, the court, when making an appropriate compensation order, should take into 
consideration the means of the particular defendant, or in the case of a juvenile offender, the 
means of his/her parent(s) or guardian(s).61 If the court considers that both a compensation order 
and a fine should be imposed, then the court has a discretion in the determination of the 
hierarchy of which of these measures should be imposed.62 In cases involving homicide, and 
unlike the situation that pertains for VIS, the dependant of the deceased victim is deemed an 
“injured party” and may petition the court.63 
 
This provision of the 1993 Act is effectively part of the sentencing process. Consequently, 
victims of crime may obtain compensation without loosing their anonymity.64 This anonymity 
would be lost if a civil action is taken as such cases are usually reported by the media. For 
example, in the McColgan case,65 the victims who had been sexually abused by their father 
                                                 
58
 Shapland, Willmore and Duff, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Gower Publishing, Aldershot, 1985). 
59
 This scheme is funded by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and administered by the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Tribunal. 
60
 The procedure is to apply to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board with receipts or vouchers for expenses, 
police reports and so forth; there is no court appearance. 
61
 s.6(5) of the 1993 Act. 
62
 s.6(7) of the 1993 Act. 
63
 s.6(12)(a) of the 1993 Act, inter alia, reads: “injured party includes a dependant…of the deceased person 
concerned”. 
64
 The court may request the Probation and Welfare Service to supervise the payment of compensation from 
defendant to victim. 
65
 McColgan v The North Western Health Board and Desmond Moran, High Court, 1998, cited in Law Reform 
Commission, Consultation Paper on The Law of Limitation of Actions Arising From Non-Sexual Abuse of Children 
(LRC-CP16–2000), p.10, n.29. 
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forfeited their anonymity to take a case against the Health Board and their family GP. Details of 
the criminal trial had not been reported due of the nature of the criminal offences involved.  
 
There are certain drawbacks with the offender-victim model of compensation in that a court 
order may only be made where the defendant has been convicted, i.e. it is part of the part of the 
sentencing process. However, every criminal offence committed does not necessarily result in 
conviction, as the offender may not be detected or, if detected, may not be prosecuted. Moreover, 
many defendants convicted of crimes may not have the financial resources to pay compensation 
to the victim when an order is made by the court. Indeed, a significant feature of the provision in 
the 1993 Act is the discretion conferred on the court by the use of the phrase “instead of or in 
addition to dealing with him in any other way”. This might result in economic discrimination 
favouring defendants who have the financial means to satisfy a compensation order and, in so 
doing receive more favourable treatment by the court, such as the imposition of a non-custodial 
sentence.66  
 
 
European Union standards 
EU Member States generally provide some form of services to victims of crime, such as social 
and psychological services. The most obvious difficulties for those charged with protecting 
victims’ rights at EU level are language barriers and the fact that potential victims will have 
different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, those victims who return to their home 
state after a crime committed in another state may encounter procedural difficulties in 
prosecuting the offender. 
 
With the increased movement between EU Member States, there is greater potential for 
individuals to become victims of crime in a Member State other than their state of residence. It is 
estimated that each year over eight million European tourists become the victims of crime.67 In 
response, the European Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal 
Proceedings68 of 2001 aims to harmonize the rights of victims of crime within the Member 
States. The 2001 Framework Decision provides for certain minimum standards for the treatment 
of the victims of crime and their families which are applicable in all Member States, and this 
requires Member States to align their respective criminal procedures in accordance with the 
Framework Decision.69  
 
While the Framework Decision covers a wide range of measures,70 the following are perhaps the 
most relevant in practical terms for the victims of crime within Member States. Article 1(a) 
adopts a broad definition of victim in the following terms: 
 
                                                 
66
 However, in the People v McLaughlin, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, July 13 2005, Kearns J. stated: “… 
there is no jurisprudence, principle or practice which renders the payment of compensation to a rape victim 
inconsistent with the imposition of a custodial sentence. Indeed, it conflicts with and contradicts the express wording 
of s 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which states that the discretion to pay compensation may be ‘instead of or in 
addition to dealing with him in any other way’.” 
67
 Spackman, “Holiday Victims of Crime” (1998, summer) Victim Support Magazine, 10–12, cited in Victim 
Support, New Rights for Victims of Crime in Europe, p.4, available at:  
http://www.victimsupport.org.uk/vs_england_wales/about_us/publications/new_rights/new_rights.pdf 
68
 (2001)/220/JHA); OJ 22.3.2001, L 82/1. 
69
 Member States were required to modify their respective national legislation before March 2002. 
70
 It made provision, inter alia, for greater access to justice for victims of crime, the protection of victim’s rights and 
recognition of the standing of victims in the criminal justice process and of course the issue of offender-victim 
compensation.  
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“’victim’ shall mean a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical or mental 
injury, emotional or economic loss, directly caused by acts or omissions that are in 
violation of the criminal law of a Member State.” (emphasis added). 
 
This definition of victim is exclusive to natural legal persons—artificial legal entities such as 
corporations are excluded—which correlates with the purpose for the introduction of victim 
assistance legislation.71 Article 2(1) provides that:  
 
“Each Member State shall ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role in its 
criminal legal system. It shall continue to make every effort to ensure that victims are 
treated with due respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings and shall 
recognise the rights and legitimate interests of victims with particular reference to criminal 
proceedings” (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, victims of crime should be provided with information about, for example, the role of the 
judge, jury, prosecution and defence. Article 4(1) also deals with the provision of information to 
the victim:  
 
“Each Member State shall ensure that victims in particular have access, as from their first 
contact with law enforcement agencies, by any means it deems appropriate and as far as 
possible in languages commonly understood, to information of relevance for the protection 
of their interests.” 
 
This would conceivably include issues such as whether a suspect is to be charged and 
prosecuted, and the subsequent progress of the criminal trial. Article 4(1) goes on to list the basic 
forms of information such as “the type of services or organisations to which they can turn for 
support”, “where and how they can report an offence” and “how and under what conditions they 
can obtain protection.” Article 4(2) requires each Member State to “ensure that victims who 
have expressed a wish to this effect are kept informed of (a) the outcome of their complaint; (b) 
the progress of the criminal proceedings against the accused; (c) the court’s sentence”. Article 
4(3) requires Member States to “take the necessary measures” to notify the victim when the 
defendant (convicted and sentenced for crimes against the victim) is released.  
 
Article 9(1) of the Framework Decision makes provision for victims of crime to claim 
compensation from the offender “in the course of criminal proceedings” except where “national 
law provides for compensation to be awarded in another manner”. This provision for offender-
victim compensation was augmented by the 2004 Council Directive on Compensation to Crime 
Victims72 which recognised that victims of crime are entitled to appropriate levels of 
compensation for the injuries the have suffered because of the crimes committed against them by 
the defendant, regardless of where the crime was committed within the EU. The 2004 Directive 
established a system of cooperation between Member States to facilitate access to compensation 
schemes for victims of serious crime where the offence was committed in a Member State other 
than the state of the victim’s residence. Each Member State is accordingly obliged to have in 
place a suitable compensation scheme for victims of crime.73 This is especially important in 
                                                 
71
 An artificial legal entity cannot suffer harm in the same way as a natural legal person, and furthermore, usually 
recuperates its financial losses. 
72
 Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004; OJ L 261, 06/08/2004 P. 0015-0018. 
73
 EU Member States are obliged to have established some form of compensation scheme for the victims of crime in 
fulfilment of their obligations under the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, 
Strasbourg, November 24, 1983. 
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consideration that many, if not most, offenders may not have the necessary means to satisfy an 
award of damages. 
 
 
Conclusion  
Although the official response to the commission of crime is by the State through the prosecution 
and punishment of offenders, the criminal justice system will fail to do justice unless more 
consideration is given to the provision of appropriate rights and services for victims of crime. In 
the light of some recent high-profile case, the approach taken to the victim in the criminal justice 
system is likely to be subjected to further scrutiny and reform.  
 
The provisions of the 1993 Act allowing for appellate review of unduly lenient sentences and the 
introduction of VIS seem to lean toward the imposition of heavier sentences on offenders. Such 
provisions may reflect a general belief that heavier punishments imposed on offenders better 
serve the interests of victims. While the 1993 Act also provides a mechanism for offender-victim 
compensation, the imposition of heavier sentences means that the offender may not be in a 
position to pay compensation. Thus, the offender-victim compensation model, as provided for by 
s.6 of the 1993 Act, may not be of real merit.74 
 
The Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings 2001 is 
innovative as it makes provision for minimum standards for the treatment of victims of crime 
and their families applicable within the European Union. The various provisions of the 
Framework Decision will undoubtedly have a fundamental impact for those travelling within EU 
Member States and will serve to ensure that assistance and support will be available to victims of 
crime situated in a Member State other than their state of residence. 
 
Whether victims of crime are afforded more procedural rights will largely depend on the effect 
of such procedural rights on the criminal justice process, which is essentially concerned with the 
prosecution and punishment of offenders by the State. There is a real danger that affording 
victims the opportunity to influence the criminal justice decision-making process would result in 
defendants facing two prosecuting authorities: the State and the victim. This would most likely 
be constitutionally impermissible. A legislative response to the needs and rights of victims of 
crime, with the provision of sufficient services for victims throughout the entire criminal justice 
process, would therefore be a more appropriate response. 
 
                                                 
74
 If an offender can afford to pay compensation this may be reflected by the courts with the imposition of a non-
custodial or perhaps reduced sentence than those who cannot afford to pay. Although this raises a question of social 
justice, or perhaps injustice, the policy of the law should be to keep as many people out of prison as possible.  
